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Abstract Notwithstanding the functional and technocratic basis of the European 
integration process, and the fact that the accession criteria hardly mention security 
issues, the 2004 eastern enlargement brought to the forefront of EU politics important 
geopolitical and security issues. Eastern enlargement came on to the agenda of the EU in 
the wake of 1989s peaceful revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Security and 
geopolitics mattered to the decision taken by the EU to embark on expansion in the early 
1990s, and thereafter security issues remained prominent in enlargement debates. This 
article seeks to analyse the most important geopolitical issues which eastern enlargement 
brought to the fore. In exploring the geopolitical dimension of the eastern enlargement 
process the article foregrounds some key issues including: the potential power 
realignments in Europe triggered by enlargement, the EU relationship with Russia and 
its importance to the unfolding of the enlargement process, and how eastern enlargement 
was conceived as a mechanism for stabilising the EU’s external environment. The article 
contrasts realist and constructivist images of post 1989 Europe and the eastern 
enlargement process and assess their contribution to enlargement scholarship. It argues 
that constructivist imagery best explains the way in which EU actors interpreted key 
geopolitical issues within the enlargement framework. In particular it presents 
enlargement as the expansion of the existing European security community where 
geopolitical issues were subject to a process of securitisation and desecuritisation. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 1 May 2004 at an historic, if understated, signing ceremony in Dublin the European 
Union increased its membership from 15 to 25. The eastern enlargement of the Union 
was the largest and the most challenging which the EU had ever faced. And while the 
academic literature on enlargement developed in tandem with political events this was 
mostly to the neglect of the geopolitical dimension of the process. There were two 
reasons for this. First, the parallel process of NATO enlargement was the locus for the 
most important security issues in the post Cold War Europe. Scholarship therefore tended 
to focus on NATO enlargement to the exclusion of the EU expansion process as political 
events unfolded. Second, the EU’s accession framework was largely functional and 
technical in its fundamental constituent elements, centred more on the ‘low politics’ of 
macro economic reform and adjustment of public administration and legal systems in 
Central and Eastern Europe to EU norms than the ‘high politics’ of statecraft and 
diplomacy. Thus, from the beginning of the accession process in the early 1990s, 
geopolitical issues did not feature prominently in the corpus of enlargement literature that 
emerged. This relative neglect of the geopolitical dimension, however, was surprising in 
that eastern enlargement was clearly going to change the EU in important ways. At the 
very least it represented a major new foreign policy challenge for the Union. The 
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enlarged EU will figure prominently in the cognitive maps of decision-makers 
worldwide; existing and emerging powers such as the United States, Russia, China and 
India simply will not remain indifferent to the way in which enlargement changes the 
fundamentals of EU power (Hill, 2002, 97). This article seeks to redress the gap in the 
literature by analysing the geopolitical dimension of the process. In doing so it 
foregrounds some key issues including: the recalibration of geopolitical power within the 
EU triggered by the 1989 revolutions, the EU relationship with Russia as enlargement 
negotiations developed, and the fears of Yugoslav-style conflicts emerging in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The article contrasts realist and constructivist images of post 1989 
Europe and the eastern enlargement process and assesses the extent to which they provide 
satisfactory explanations of outcomes. It argues that the EU approached geopolitical 
issues within the enlargement process from a ‘soft’ security template and sought to de-
link territoriality from traditional security concerns, to ‘normalise’ a broad range of 
geopolitical issues as domestic EU politics within the enlargement negotiations. In other 
words the enlarging Europe was framed as an expanding security community, to be 
constructed through a process of what the Copenhagen School of International Relations 
terms ‘desecuritisation’. Instability and existential threats to Europe’s peace and security 
were to be managed through a process of controlled expansion and institutionalised 
cooperation. The article begins by outlining realist interpretations of post 1989 Europe. 
 
 
 
 
Post 1989 Europe: the Return of Anarchy? 
 
 
In the period following the collapse of communism and the bipolar system the academic 
community rushed to contribute to the debate on the future of international politics. 
Whilst Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the ‘End of History’, and Samuel Huntington the 
‘Clash of Civilisations’, realist scholars, although divided on any number of issues, were 
generally very pessimistic about the prospects for progress. Although realists (and 
especially neorealists) had little to say about the European integration process,1 John 
Mearsheimer (1990) for one predicted that Europe would remain mired in history and 
indeed go ‘back to the future’. This was a world of historical déjà vu, as Jim George 
(2000, 33) put it, characterised by elementary and structurally induced threat. And that 
future would inevitably bring a fracturing of the European compact as a result of new 
modes of power balancing by individual states against perceived threats to state security. 
The realist argument was based on a view that, with the removal of the artificial 
straitjacket provided by the Cold War, the new European geopolitics would be one of 
competitive coexistence, a return to a more pure form of Hobbesian anarchy. The Cold 
War, in this view, had provided Western Europe with a secure and stable eastern frontier 
(W.Wallace 2002, 78). But where the Cold War had provided the critical leviathans for 
                                                 
1 Within the discipline of IR European Integration was for long treated as an insignificant and provincial 
terrain unworthy of the interest of (mostly American) scholars. See Knud Erik Jørgensen (2000). The most 
recent comprehensive realist approach to European integration is provided by Anders Wivel (2004). 
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each geopolitical bloc in the US and USSR, this new world seemed to herald the return of 
self-help attitudes straight from the canon of classical realist thinking.  
 
 
The empirical demonstration of this new amorphous European constellation was clearly 
evident in the appearance of new states and the attendant recalibration of international 
frontiers. Where in 1989 there existed 27 states in Europe, by 1992 this had risen to 42 
with the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.2 One estimate suggested that 
8,000 miles of new borders were created out of the old demarcations (Mungiu-Pippidiu 
2002, 52). And where there appeared new borders there also developed the manifest 
potential for conflict. New international frontiers were created such as those of the Baltic 
States, the Yugoslav successor states, and out of the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Some 
were re-configured as a result of war, others by democratic agreement (Bort 2002, 191). 
The more pessimistic predictions seemed apposite as Yugoslavia imploded and 
Europeans caught a glimpse of the disturbing new reality of fratricidal inter-state ethno-
nationalist conflagrations. As the violence spiralled out of control in the Balkans, 
European political élites worried about similar conflicts breaking out in other parts of the 
continent. The disturbing legacy of European history meant the potential re-emergence of 
irredentism, and the presence of sizeable minorities in many of the new states left many 
fearful that the Yugoslav imbroglio rather than the relative harmony of the EU model was 
the template for the future.  
 
 
Realist perspectives also suggested that enlargement presented an enormous challenge to 
the task of preserving the balance of power in Europe. In short, the new geopolitical 
environment brought into sharp focus a new set of security externalities that threatened 
the achievements of the successful post-1945 European compact. For one thing the 1989 
revolutions had brought the German Question back to the centre of European politics. 
The question of how German power might reassert itself occupied the minds of many 
policy-makers, not least the Germans themselves. The mantra that what German élites 
sought was ‘not a German Europe but a European Germany’ was consistently deployed 
to assuage the concerns of those who feared a resurgence of German power. Similarly, 
German commitment to the deeper integration embedded in the Maastricht Treaty was 
presented as evidence of German bona fides. Despite such assurances, however, there 
were many who argued that, in the long run, the worst German tendencies would re-assert 
themselves and Central and Eastern Europe would become again, either directly through 
the projection of military and political power, or indirectly through the projection of 
Germany’s vast economic power, a zone of vassal states, which over time would help 
fracture the peaceable inter-state system built up through the integration process. The 
                                                 
2 My estimate includes all of the new states of Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia (later 
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) and Slovenia, which emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
It also includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Russia as the states to emerge from the old Soviet Union. The Central Asian states to emerge from the 
Soviet Union are excluded. Finally, the Czech and Slovak republics are included as separate entities, as are 
Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey.  
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potential destabilisation of the Franco-German alliance, which had from the beginning 
powered the European integration process, also gave considerable cause for concern.  
 
 
Realist perspectives on eastern enlargement also emphasised how expansion could be 
viewed as part of an ongoing project – to turn the EU into a superstate and a genuine 
great power that could compete with the United States and emerging powers such as 
China and India. The EU, in this view, instrumentally used eastern enlargement as the 
principal vehicle for this geopolitical advance which brought into the Union eight new 
states in Central and Eastern Europe, moved the EU border hundreds of miles east from 
Berlin to Tallinn (within miles of St. Petersburg), and added 80 million new citizens. 
Christopher Hill suggests that the EU already shows signs of behaving like a great power. 
In evidence he points to the EU’s increasingly prioritising its own ‘near abroad’ through 
the Euro Mediterranean Partnership and a common strategy on Russia (Hill 2002, 96). 
Eastern enlargement was augmented with a Wider Europe initiative which then became 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), designed to encourage the further gravitation 
of Europe’s peripheral states toward Brussels. Territorial expansion will only continue as 
the addition of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 (or 2008) will bring the Union’s borders 
right up to the shore of the Black Sea. Whether in response to internal or external 
considerations, the EU, throughout the enlargement process, presented important security 
and geopolitical arguments as part of the underlying rationale for justifying expansion. 
Atsuko Higashino, for example, cites the declaration at the Helsinki European Council in 
1999, which portrayed enlargement as a means to ‘lend a positive contribution to security 
and stability on the European continent’. The rhetoric of EU leaders was as focused on 
security issues, she argues, as on economic or normative ones (Higashino 2004, 348). Her 
analysis of the speeches and statements of EU leaders throws up a rhetorical structure that 
consistently highlights the ‘existential threats’ to European security as a specific 
opportunity cost of failure to enlarge. Enlargement represented the only viable alternative 
to the various threat scenarios. CEE state representatives of course, also deployed this 
form of discourse strategically as a supplementary weapon used in conjunction with their 
more usual norm-based appeals for membership (Ibid., 351).  
 
 
If EU actors highlighted such existential threats arising out of or in response to eastern 
enlargement their cognitive understanding of the geopolitical issues at stake was not 
informed by Realist notions of power balancing and material self-interest. Rather, as the 
article will go on to demonstrate, enlargement policy (and any threat perceptions 
associated with it) was conceived out of a specific understanding of the new Europe as a 
community of values, an extended zone of peaceable inter-state relations, where problem 
solving through institutionalised cooperation would become the norm. Where specific 
threats were framed by EU actors as security issues the understanding of security was a 
very different one to that informed by traditional conceptions of security. To understand 
how EU actors approached security and geopolitics within the framework of eastern 
enlargement it is necessary to explore constructivist ideas relating to inter-state 
interaction in institutionalised contexts and, specifically, the concept of security 
communities as arenas for collective action. 
 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructing the enlarged EU security community 
 
 
Constructivist approaches to international politics are distinguished by the effort to seek 
some sort of understanding between the natural world and the human or social world. 
Nicholas Onuf (1989, 59) points to a ‘world of our making’ and suggests that social 
relations make or construct people into the kind of beings that we are. Alexander Wendt 
in his seminal Social Theory of International Politics (1999, 69-71) tries to understand 
‘social kinds’ and ‘natural kinds’. The constructivist approach, although increasingly 
diverse, is made up of two important hypotheses. First, it is contended that the structures 
of international life are not exclusively material but also consist of a substantial ideational 
dimension; this means that the security dilemma traditionally associated with anarchy is, 
in fact, what Wendt suggests it is - what we make of it - in other words, an ideational 
construct rather than a material reality. Such a perspective does not deny the importance 
of material structures or a phenomenal world external to thought but rather seeks to 
understand that world in relation to human behaviour or social structure. Thus 
constructivists consistently argue that students of IR must take ideas and norms, 
constructed out of and reproduced through human contact, more seriously. Second, the 
contribution made by intersubjective shared meanings between purposive state actors 
decisively determines identities and interests in the international system. In other words, 
as Risse-Kappen (1995, 502) suggests, actors’ interests and preferences cannot simply be 
treated as unproblematic and exogenous to structure. To a great extent those interests are 
made clearer as a result of interaction with other states and membership of international 
organisations. In the same way security is defined in collectivist rather than individualist 
and objective terms, the security environment as one which is dynamic rather than static. 
Wendt (1999, op.cit., 24) refers to this approach as ‘structural idealism’ (in opposition to 
existing structural realist theories such as those of Waltz).  
 
 
The differences between and among the different streams of constructivist thought are 
significant.3 Nevertheless all constructivist approaches share the basic claim that the 
‘neo-neo’ synthesis (and by implication most IR theory) is ‘undersocialised’ in the sense 
that it pays insufficient attention to the ways in which international life are socially 
constructed (Wendt, 1999, op.cit., 4). And for constructivists one of the most important 
features of contemporary international politics is the community-building and security-
enhancing possibilities arising out of state engagement with multilateral international 
institutions. International institutions open up new opportunities for inter-state 
                                                 
3 On differences within the Constructivist school see Checkel (2003); Guzzini, (2000), Jacobsen, (2003), 
Ruggie, (1998), and Smith, (1999). 
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cooperation, change the patterns of state behaviour, and can create the conditions under 
which the structural quicksand that is international anarchy may be overcome. 
 
 
Constructivists interested in exploring the links between state identities and interests have 
re-discovered the concept of security community in seeking to develop ideas about the 
norm-generating potential of international organisations. In the original formulation by 
Karl Deutsch, a security community was defined as a collection of states that had become 
integrated to such a point that there is a ‘real assurance that the members of that 
community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in a peaceful 
way’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998, 6). The concept thus revolves around ‘dependable 
expectations of peaceful change’. That is that states within the community possess a 
compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and mutual 
responsiveness - a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of ‘we-ness’, and are 
integrated so closely that the aforementioned ‘dependable expectations of peaceful 
change’ has become the norm (Russet, 1998, 373). Thus for ‘democratic peace’ theorists 
Immanuel Kant’s postulate, developed in his Perpetual Peace (1795), has been 
empirically substantiated. Wendt’s Social Theory (chapter six) argues that at its core the 
international system is being slowly transformed into a Kantian culture. In this sense we 
have moved from Hobbesian state rivalries (defined by enmity), to a Lockean culture 
(defined by rivalrous competition), to one where we see the emergence of a growing 
number of states that are predisposed toward external self-restraint and interdependence 
(Wendt, op.cit., 174).  
 
 
For most analysts the European Union is the best example of a pluralistic security 
community in today’s international system.4 The Member states of the EU certainly take 
‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ for granted in an institutional context 
which is underpinned by a set of core behavioural values. Since the foundation of the 
European Communities in the 1950s, European integration was meant to create and 
stabilise a security community that would replace the traditional rivalries and contestation 
for power and resources between and among the European states. In its course, the 
Community members not only established a stable democratic peace amongst themselves 
but also a unique set of institutions and legal order. This is indeed a type of regional 
organisation representing a community of values with the real achievement of the EU, 
being the lasting reconciliation between former enemies. Since 1989 European security 
has revolved almost exclusively (if not always directly) around the institutional settings 
of the EU (Waever, 1998, 69-70). And the eastern enlargement of the European Union 
became the most direct and important instrument for extending the existing security 
community eastward. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Here I employ Deutsch’s distinction between an ‘amalgamated security community’ where formal unity 
becomes the norm and a ‘pluralistic security communities’ where sovereignty is retained by individual 
states. 
 6
Eastern enlargement as such duplicated the earlier processes of inter-state cooperation 
and community building which shaped the early integration process in Western Europe. 
Its aim was that of transforming former adversaries into allies and transporting the CEE 
states directly into the heart of the European security community, which, although 
comprising of a range of different institutions,5 nevertheless has a distinct centre of 
gravity in the EU. Enlargement would facilitate the transmission of new norms from the 
EU to the candidate states, thus helping to transform the ‘Eastern’ European states into 
‘European’ states’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998, 420). This is surely what former 
Commission President Romano Prodi (2001) meant when he said that: ‘our enlargement 
strategy ensures that these values are enshrined in the candidate countries before they can 
join the EU. Democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will become the 
norm throughout the expanding Union’. The cognitive model was one which highlighted 
the transformation in Franco-German relations after the Second World War, as one which 
could be emulated in the re-constitution of German-Polish relations, Hungarian-
Romanian relations, indeed any inter-state relationship previously characterised by 
tensions over territory, ethnic minorities, or disputed historical narratives. Thus the earlier 
patterns of peace building have been replicated in Central and Eastern Europe and indeed 
extended far beyond what was initially envisaged in the early 1990s. The EU has 
employed a virtually identical political-institutional mix in South Eastern Europe 
(Stabilisation and Association Process), the Euro-Mediterranean area (the Barcelona 
Process) and beyond (the Wider Neighbourhood policy), even if different (non-accession) 
outcomes are likely. The very success of EU community-building in Central and Eastern 
Europe thus promoted the extension of community-enhancing instruments to the wider 
Europe. 
 
 
Analysis of the enlargement discourse employed by EU representatives indicates a clear 
attachment to the concept of an expanding security community. Former enlargement 
Commissioner Hans van den Bröek, in a 1997 speech, for example, referred to the EU as 
a ‘genuine security community in which the very idea of war between any members can 
be dismissed out of hand’. It was of a pattern where the European Commission actively 
sought to create a we-feeling both amongst the applicant states from CEE and also, 
obviously, between the EU member states and the individual applicant states. The 
building of trust through enlargement-related institutional engagement and capacity 
building became a central preoccupation of EU strategists as EU-CEE relations deepened. 
This assertion is supported by a stream of Commission documentation that emphasises 
that the EU wanted to create in the East a ‘psychological environment of mutual trust’, 
and a ‘feeling of belonging’ (European Commission, 1994). Council and Commission 
officials regularly reiterated the importance of extending the post-1945 model of 
reconciliation and cooperation. Thus from the beginning eastern enlargement was 
conceptualised as a contemporary security enhancing project, one which would embed 
EU norms in the former communist states and ensure a successful extension of the 
existing pluralistic security community.  
 
                                                 
5 These include the non-EU organizations the Council of Europe (C of E), the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO.  
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Normalising existential threats through Desecuritisation 
 
 
The scholarship of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Atsuko Higashino and others on EU 
security provides the most useful template for understanding how the EU conceptualised 
eastern enlargement in community building terms and as a mechanism for normalising 
inter-state geopolitical relations. In particular Wæver’s emphasis on ‘securitisation’ and 
‘desecuritisation’ allows us to demonstrate how EU actors framed a specific geopolitical 
discourse intended to shape the development and direction of the eastern enlargement 
process. Securitisation theory highlights the significance of speech acts, of specific 
discursive constructs, which help frame issues in international politics and which 
influence the boundaries for action for each individual issue. Or as Wæver (1996, 106) 
puts it: ‘Security is a practice, a specific way of framing an issue’. In the process the 
securitisation move is employed in order to transfer issues from the world of external or 
hard security into the internal or soft security realm. The patterns of issue 
transfer/transformation will of course vary according to the importance of the issue, the 
relative willingness of the actors to accept the securitisation move and the general macro 
security climate in which the issue is embedded. The process of securitising an issue 
begins with the declaration of it as a security issue, essentially as an existential threat to 
the peace and security of the region, which requires collective action in order to avoid 
escalation and conflict. The process of de-escalation is achieved through a desecuritising 
move, one which seeks to stabilise and normalise a state of existing or potential inter-
state conflict by élite level discursive interventions targeted at transforming the 
existential threat into the everyday and normal.  
 
 
It has often been asserted that the European integration process itself constituted the most 
outstanding example of desecuritisation in contemporary international politics 
(Higashino, 2004, 350). Such a view presents eastern enlargement as another important 
episode of desecuritusation through integration. This argument rests on the premise that 
in the aftermath of the Cold War the EU and Europe needed enlargement in order to 
avoid fragmentation and conflict, to guard against a future characterised by Hobbesian 
mistrust and recurrent wars. The logic here is that Europe, for most of its history, has 
been a conflictual inter-state system, where a number of great powers (constituted as city 
states, multinational empires and later nation states) competed for influence and allies, 
and where the collective management of geopolitical issues continually floundered on the 
rocks of Manichean calculation and the desire to achieve state security.  
 
 
This conceptualization of eastern enlargement also contained a strong emphasis on the 
self-negating, self-transforming potential in relation to Europe itself. It posited Europe’s 
contemporary ‘other’, the traditional enemy image, not in the form of an external state or 
empire or ideological system but rather Europe’s own past which should not be allowed 
to become its future (Diez 2001; Higashino 2004). Proponents of this view routinely 
argued that the opportunity cost of non-enlargement would be the very patterns of 
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fragmentation leading to resurgent nationalism and a ‘back to the future’ geopolitical 
trajectory that manifested themselves so tragically in Yugoslavia (Higashino, 2004. 350). 
Enlargement was thus understood as part of an ongoing process of constituting Europe as 
a place of attraction rather than conflict, as centred on its own soft security values rather 
than a hard security enemy template. Just as the Franco-German rivalry of Europe’s past 
mutated into the Franco-German motor of integration, so the zone of instability in Central 
and Eastern Europe was to be transformed through a process of normalising state 
relations through the successfully established patterns of institutionalized cooperation 
associated with the European integration process. Integration is presented as the only 
option suitably robust enough to prevent a return to Europe’s tormented past. 
Desecuritisation was to be achieved through changing the terms of discourse through 
which individual and sometimes linked geopolitical issues were framed, from one based 
on traditional modes of security (reactions to material threats which emphasise the 
material resources to be employed in combating these threats) to a discourse which 
sought to consider the threats as part of the internalized everyday politics of the European 
integration process, in this case manifested in the rules of the enlargement process. The 
article goes on to identify the two most important existential threats identified by EU 
élites during the eastern enlargement process and to demonstrate how they were subject 
to a process of desecuritisation. The first was the threat of instability arising in Central 
and Eastern Europe itself and the second the different types of threat emanating from 
post-Soviet Russia. 
 
 
Eastern enlargement as a mechanism for stabilising Central and Eastern Europe 
 
 
From the earliest stages of the eastern enlargement process EU political representatives 
sought to securitise and then desecuritise a range of issues deemed to constitute 
geopolitical problems for the Union as a whole. We may also term these issues negative 
externalities arising out of the new EU-CEE interdependence of the early 1990s. These 
issues were gradually subject to a process of discursive framing as specific and existential 
threats to the peace, security and welfare of the EU; this in turn justified programmes 
aimed at issue transformation and transfer to the terrain of integration. Specifically I 
highlight two such issue areas which were subject to a securitisation move leading to a 
desecuritisation treatment within the framework of the enlargement process.  
 
In the first place eastern enlargement brought onto the EU agenda a new set of 
environmental problems which were quickly framed as trans-European and as threatening 
to the macro security of all. As Hill (2002, 106) points out, eastern enlargement promised 
the opportunity of institutional regulation of the environmental problems associated with 
the old smokestack industries in Eastern Europe, and created new possibilities for 
protecting the peoples of both candidate states and existing member states from any 
future environmental disasters on their borders. The candidate states inherited daunting 
environmental challenges, however. Before 1989 air pollution was a major problem 
particularly in the northern region (Poland, the Czech Republic and former East 
Germany) due to heavy industries and reliance on brown coal for energy. Water pollution 
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in the form of hazardous substances and nutrients affected all CEE countries and soil 
degradation was also part of the negative inheritance from the past. As the transition 
process took hold economic and social restructuring presented new environmental 
problems particularly arising out of mass consumerism, the increase in all forms of 
transportation and sharp rises in waste disposal. In addition, the candidate states, faced 
with a myriad of economic challenges, did not prioritize environmental issues to the same 
degree as other Western states and the NGO sector that emerged in this area was 
generally weak (Birger Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2004). So in a myriad number of ways 
eastern enlargement threatened to impose a significant economic cost on the EU, and 
especially on those states which shared borders with the candidate countries. Thus an 
issue which during previous enlargement rounds remained relatively insignificant was 
elevated to the status of a trans-European security problem which necessarily required a 
forceful and coercive EU role in insisting on candidate state adoption of the entire EU 
environmental acquis. The EU strategy of securitisation and desecuritisation was even 
more evident in respect of the approach to nuclear power stations in the candidate states. 
Indeed the prioritisation of nuclear safety represented one of the best examples of such 
framing activities by EU representatives.6 Ignalina in Lithuania and Kozludy in Bulgaria 
ceased to be issues for bilateral negotiation between the EU and candidate countries. The 
existential threat which they constituted to the EU (future Chernobyl’s waiting to happen) 
justified a securitisation move and a desecuritisation strategy built on the familiar 
integration dualism of EU capacity building (in the form of aid for decommissioning of 
aged plants) combined with conditionality/coercion.  
 
 
As policy-makers considered the wider problems provoked by the emergence of a ‘zone 
of instability’ in CEE in the early 1990s it became clear that inter-state border conflicts 
represented the greatest threat to European security.  In the wake of 1989 the Yugoslav 
conflict provided convincing evidence of the potentially fratricidal nature of future inter-
state relations in the region. The volatility of Central and Eastern Europe was a function 
of long-standing historical grievances regarding territory, irredentist border claims, the 
presence of significant ethnic minorities in neighbouring states and their treatment by 
those states, and the weakness of the emerging governance structures in the new 
democracies. In the early 1990s many commentators argued that the worst potential 
flashpoint in Europe was that between Hungary and Romania. This dated back to the 
Treaty of Trianon in 1920 under which Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and sixty 
per cent of its population. In the aftermath of 1989 ethnic Hungarian populations of 
significance remained not only in Romania (2.7 million) but also in Slovakia (500, 000) 
and Vojvodina in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria contained within its territory a significant Turkish 
population that had been subject to a programme of discrimination and deportation under 
the Todor Zhikov regime in the 1980s. The sizeable Russian minorities in the Baltic 
States also presented a challenge to EU policy (Liebich 2002, 131-34). The historical 
legacy was compounded by the presence of a range of soft security issues such as cross 
border crime, transnational drug smuggling and people trafficking, and potentially large-
scale out migration to Western Europe arising from the chaos of social disorder in CEE. 
                                                 
6 See European Commission (1998, 1-10) for a cogent example of such framing. 
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These were regularly cited by EU political representatives as disruptive geopolitical 
problems which necessitated innovative thinking and mechanisms of desecuritisation.  
 
 
Taken together these issues constituted both a reason for EU caution regarding 
enlargement but also one of the primary geopolitical motivations for expansion. Thus the 
EU sought to put in place a substantive instrument for guarding against the possible 
corrosion of inter-state relations. This represented a crucial part of the EU’s pre- 
accession strategy and was introduced at the Essen summit in 1994 and further developed 
through the ‘Pact on Stability in Europe’ (European Council, 1994. The central ambition 
for the Pact was to ensure that the EU model of peaceful co-existence and stable inter-
state relations could be expanded east and south so as to ensure the elimination of all 
significant security issues.7 It would put an end to irredentist claims, encourage trans-
border economic development and cooperation, and help inculcate the European spirit in 
a region more traditionally defined by ethnic tensions and lingering post War hostilities. 
In this the EU sought to minimise the security risk attached to enlargement and thus it 
constituted a substantive process of preventative diplomacy and desecuritisation (Baun 
2000, 61). A combination of capacity building and coercion through conditionality was 
used throughout. And although as time went on the EU focused its efforts more on the 
transformation of domestic conditions as the optimum strategy, the Pact’s significance in 
terms of norm generation and diffusion was of the utmost significance (de Witte 2002, 
142). It certainly contributed to the building of trust and the dissipation of geopolitical 
tensions. 
 
 
The Stability Pact and the other measures demanded of candidate states undertaken as 
part of the EU’s pre-accession process can be viewed as classic instruments of 
desecuritisation. The EU sought to take issues which might traditionally have been 
negotiated in bilateral nation state fora, deliberately reclassify them as ‘security’ issues 
and then proceed to desecuritise them by subjecting them to processes of collective 
institutional cooperation under the rubric of the pre-accession process. Policy-makers saw 
enlargement as an opportunity to stabilise the EU’s external environment and as such as a 
positive contribution to their own security. This was especially the case in respect of the 
Stability Pact’s main goal of neutralising inter-state territorial disputes, but also the case 
in respect of guarantees of state protection of minority rights, environmental degradation 
and migration flows. All were classified as sources of potential instability, as macro 
geopolitical problems for the Union as a whole, rather than micro or jurisdictionally 
specific problems. 
 
 
                                                 
7 One of the many double standards evident in the eastern enlargement process was that the principle of 
achieving lasting resolution of border disputes was not applied to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus 
(Greek Cyprus). Although prior to the 2004 accessions one final effort was made to resolve the question 
(through the UN), the Greek threat to veto the entire eastern enlargement process was sufficient to ensure 
that the Cyprus question was treated differently to similar (if not as protracted) problems in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Greek Cypriot accession did not require a priori resolution of the Cyprus problem. 
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EU-Russian relations and Eastern Enlargement 
 
 
The second recurring existential threat to be considered here is that of Russian power, 
both actual and potential, and Russian interpretations of and reactions to the eastern 
enlargement process. Although the implosion of the Soviet Union and the loss of its 
satellite states left the successor state - the Russian Federation – weaker, Russia in the 
1990s continued to represent the greatest potential ‘existential threat’ to the power of the 
EU and to the peace and stability of the continent. In the first place Russia retained a 
formidable military capacity and significant natural resources. It provided over a fifth of 
EU energy needs and almost one third of Germany’s (International Herald Tribune, 11 
April 2005). It boasted the largest standing army on the European continent, a significant 
air, land and naval capability and, most crucially, a nuclear arsenal far in excess of those 
of the UK and France, the EU’s only nuclear powers.  
 
 
Changing the focus somewhat from pure power politics and geopolitical competition, the 
eastern enlargement of the EU can be much more convincingly portrayed as an effort to 
balance against the instability created by the fragmentation of Russian power and the lack 
of stability in Russia’s domestic politics. Russia, for Georg Sørensen (2001, 46), is akin 
to a drifting supertanker, uncertain of what kind of statehood it will end up with. Political 
institutions outside of the Presidency are impotent and citizenship has little substantive 
meaning. The success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the Russian Parliamentary elections of 
December 1992, and the popularity of the ‘red/brown’ alliance (communist and 
nationalist) raised early concerns within the EU about the prospects for democracy in 
Russia, and increased fears in Central and Eastern Europe that a more nationalist and 
aggressive Russia would upset the geostrategic balance in the new Europe by seeking to 
reclaim its Empire. This triggered new demands from CEE and a EU response that 
privileged CEE accession as the only credible strategy whilst developing a new EU-
Russia strategic partnership (Baun 2000, 54). It is not too difficult to envisage a sclerotic 
Russia turning toward a revived nationalism in whatever new form, increasingly causing 
difficulties with the Baltic States or Ukraine, for example.8 As Christopher Hill (2002, 
105) argues, it would not be too dramatic a leap then for the EU and Russia to seem to 
each other like real security threats. President Putin’s rhetoric in the run up to the 60th 
anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War unnerved many with its nostalgia for 
Russia’s imperial past and its message that Russia continued to define its interests at the 
expense of its neighbours.9
 
 
Of equal concern throughout the eastern enlargement process was the fact that Russian 
central government was extremely weak, under both Yeltsin and Putin. And where 
                                                 
8 The Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia represent respectively 29.6 per cent and 28.1 per cent of the 
population, while the proportion is much smaller in Lithuania at 8.7 per cent. See Dov Lynch (2003, 84). 
9 Putin referred to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 as a measure to enhance Russia’s national security and 
went on to describe the collapse of the Soviet Union as the ‘greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th 
century’. See Bugajski (2005). 
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Vladamir Putin acted to restore Moscow’s prerogatives within the Russian federation this 
had the effect of convincing western policy-makers that he was taking Russia back to a 
more authoritarian and hostile form of state.10 The Putin government’s actions against 
Mikhael Khodorkovsky and Yukos in 2004 only reinforced this perception. Putin’s 
determination to reassert Russian power manifested itself most obviously in the ‘near 
abroad’ and on the Chechen question. Russian military adventurism in the Caucasues 
both undermined Russian power and contributed to growing instability on the EU’s 
eastern frontiers. Continued interference in Georgia and manifest interference in 
Ukrainian domestic politics (especially during the Presidential election in 2004), left EU 
policy-makers convinced that the Russian threat was now defined by its propensity for 
creating instability as much as by any military threat it could wield. Thus EU policy-
makers acknowledged this type of security externality and presented eastern enlargement 
as, in part, an effort to ‘lock in’ the CEE states into the EU orbit and guard against the 
westward migration of the problems generated by Russian instability.  
 
 
Equally, however, EU representatives engaged in securitisation moves (discursive 
interventions and policy initiatives), which resulted in desecuritisation of Russia as an 
existential threat within the enlargement framework. EU policy was undoubtedly helped 
by the fact that Russian threat perceptions focused more on NATO expansion than EU 
expansion as the main threat it faced on its western borders. This was because the EU’s 
development as a pluaralistic non-military security community threatened few of Russia’s 
vital national interests in the way that NATO was perceived to (Breslauer, 2003, 41). 
Undoubtedly also policy-makers on both sides could point to different types of 
interdependence to support desecuritisation moves. This was especially the case in the 
energy sector where Russia retained formidable leverage over the energy-dependent EU. 
But this power was balanced by the fact that Russia relied on crucial transit routes 
through the Baltic states for getting its oil and gas to western markets.  
 
 
The EU’s desecuritisation moves began with a series of efforts to reduce potential friction 
with Russia. Russia mutated over time from a ‘strategic rival’ to a ‘strategic partner’ in 
EU discourse. In the first instance the institution of a so-called ‘Northern Dimension’ to 
the eastern enlargement process was in part a desecuritisation move by the EU. Adopted 
in 1998-9 on the initiative of Finland, the Northern Dimension held as a crucial objective 
the desire to improve regional and sub-regional cooperative structures and to resolve the 
potential tensions with Russia through constructive engagement (Breslauer, 2003, 42). 
Second, the imposition of a minority-rights conditionality framework within the pre-
accession process was designed in part to placate Russian concerns about the treatment of 
Russian nationals in the Baltic States. Indeed the decision to exclude Latvia from the 
initial accession negotiations, which were instituted in March 1998, was influenced by its 
relative failure to adhere to EU standards in this area (notwithstanding that these were 
quite ill-defined). The most important EU instrument of desecuritisation, however, was 
the institution of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia. This 
                                                 
10 This was most obviously demonstrated in the decision post-Beslan (the justification) to replace Russia’s 
directly elected regional governors with governmental appointees. 
 13
became the central mechanism for building EU-Russian relations in the context of eastern 
enlargement. The PCA was initialed in 1994 but took more than three years to come into 
force. In some ways it replicated the instruments, modalities and institutional processes of 
the enlargement process. The crucial difference, however, was that it did not offer even a 
perspective on future Russian membership of the EU. Instead for the EU it was intended 
to strengthen mutual understanding and encourage a perception of common interests 
between Russia and the enlarging EU. The important point here is that threat reduction 
was to be achieved through ongoing and intense political dialogue and institutional 
interaction. The new common institutions were in some senses designed to socialise 
Russian elites into the everyday problem-solving structures of the European integration 
process without offering them the prospect of membership itself. The deepening of EU-
Russian relations is very evident in the multiple arenas of dialogue where the Council, 
Commission and Parliament pursue continuous discussions with their Russian 
counterparts. As Schmitt (2003, 17) puts it: ‘The PCA is not just an expression of good 
intentions; it has spurred the creation of tangible structures to ensure that good intentions 
are actually pursued’. Thus over time and in tandem with the eastern enlargement process 
the EU managed to build a relationship with Russia defined more by pragmatic 
cooperation and growing institutional confidence than by tension over persistent 
existential threats.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The article sought to analyse the EU’s eastern enlargement from the hitherto neglected 
dimensions of security and geopolitics. Eastern enlargement arose out of the dramatic 
changes wrought by the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement 
quickly became a priority for the Union, if indeed others such as Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) were more quickly realised. From the outset geopolitical issues featured 
strongly in the calculus of EU leaders. Enlargement increased both the size of the EU 
population and the territory it covers by a significant degree (about one third in each 
case). This meant that the European Union stretched in 2004 from the Atlantic in the west 
to within miles of St. Petersburg in the east, and after 2007, to the Black Sea coast in the 
south east. Enlargement thus brought with it new dangers and new geopolitical 
opportunities for the Union. Realist interpretations of the eastern enlargement largely 
revolved around the re-definition of inter-state relations, the reconfiguration of the 
European power balance, and different types of threat perceptions. While eastern 
enlargement may have been a vehicle for containing both Russian power and the 
consequences of Russian state weakness, EU policy toward Russia was both assertive 
and conciliatory.  
 
Enlargement is better understood as a specific geopolitical response to instability in 
Central and Eastern Europe and a determination to avoid the fragmentation and horrors of 
Yugoslavia. It was an indication of the success of the eastern enlargement that Serbia and 
Montenegro, for long outside of the loop of European integration, began to gravitate 
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toward the Community model which it had for long distained. Eastern enlargement 
helped stabilise and then normalise inter-state relations in Eastern Europe and ensure a 
peaceful transition from communism to European integration. Security considerations 
were especially important in both moving the enlargement process forward at critical 
junctures and also changing the contours of enlargement in specific ways. The article 
argued that a constructivist framework of analysis, which posits the EU as a pluaralistic 
security community and eastern enlargement as the central vehicle propelling the 
expansion of that community, provides the most convincing explanation of the 
enlargement story. EU actors interpreted enlargement-related geopolitical issues as 
different types of security challenges. In the process of making securitising moves they 
laid the groundwork for a process of desecuritisation which transformed the external into 
the internal, the geopolitical into the everyday politics of European integration.  
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